Rommel Rundstedt Controversy Essay -- War, Invasion of France, Normand

There are significant reasons why Field Marshal Rundstedt’s operational concept to defend against the Allied invasion of France was superior to Field Marshal Rommel’s and could have changed the course of the war. Geographically, Rundstedt’s concept provided the Germans the best chance to defeat the Allied advance. Operationally, he accounted for several military and intelligence assessment considerations that gave his plan the edge. From a strategic and political standpoint, had Hitler been willing to negotiate peace, a major Allied defeat in France offered by Rundstedt’s plan presented Germany its last chance to achieve victory. Had Rommel made a proper assessment of the French coastline and countryside, he would have probably sided with Rundstedt. â€Å"It was clear to von Rundstedt that 2,600 kilometers of coastline could not be made impregnable†¦Ã¢â‚¬  (Ose, 8) In Rundstedt’s view, the best strategy to defend the coast â€Å"called for using an offensive defensive by operating behind the coast strong armored divisions, strictly controlled and flexibly led.† (Ose, 9) Obvious geographic challenges along the coast meant that Rommel’s plan to be decisive with armored divisions would have given the German Army little chance of success. The first major problem with Rommel’s plan was the length of coastline which would have been impossible to defend unless he was lucky enough to determine the exact time and location of attack. The long coastline of France had already overextended German forces and their defenses were growing weaker due to commitments elsewhere in the Europ ean theater. (Cubbage, 149) Even with Rommel’s plan for extensive obstacles along the coast, it seems he â€Å"forgot that a concrete and steel barrier with an exploitable wea... ...epts to defeat the Allied invasion of France. Upon examination of each operational concept, it becomes clear that Rundstedt’s plan would have given the German Army the best chance of success. In the summer of 1944, a decisive victory over Allied forces in France could have drawn Great Britain and the United States to the negotiating table. A decisive victory would have also afforded the Germans more forces on the Eastern Front. More forces in the east could have halted the Soviet advance, and could have brought Stalin to the negotiating table as well. Given those possibilities, we know in hindsight that it would have been unlikely for Hitler or the Allies to accept anything less than total victory. In other words, the operational success offered by Rundstedt’s plan would not have translated into strategic victory given the resolve of Hitler and the Allies.